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The Crescent and the Union:
Islam Returns to Western Europe
JOHN D. SNETHEN*
INTRODUCTION
Almost 1,300 years after Charles the Hammer turned back the Muslim
incursion into Frankish territory,' Islam has a foothold in Europe, though
under more peaceful circumstances and a different international system.
Today, because of Muslim migrants who began arriving in Europe from North
Africa, Turkey, and the Middle East during the economic boom years of the
1960s, Islam is growing faster than any other religion in Europe.2 Although
Europe has in recent years tightened its immigration policies,3 the European
Union (EU) must rely on migrant labor to help support Europeans' generous
pensions as the median age of Europeans increases:4
In many European countries birth rates have fallen so far and
the population is aging so fast that there are now more deaths
than births. Since most European countries prohibit
immigration to protect their workers' jobs, the lack of any
natural increase means that the total number of persons will
decline, with the highest rate of shrinkage among young
people.'
J.D., Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, 2000. I am grateful to Professor Nafhat
Nasr for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and to my wife, Lena Nasr Snethen, who
edited many drafts of this work. I also wish to thank the IJGLS Board of Editors and Associates for the
many hours they worked on the text and footnotes of this Article.
1. See Charles Martel, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANICA, at http://www.britannica.coml bcom/eb/
article/8/0,57 ! 6,22948+l+22587,00.html?query=charles%20marte (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
2. Jaap Donath, Moslim in dePolder, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 22, 1998, at 138.
3. See Michael Banton, National Integration and Ethnic Violence in Western Europe, 25 J. ETHNIC
& MIGR. STUD. 5, 5 (1999).
4. See Amab Banerji, Why Europe Needs Emerging Markets, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1998, at 4. See
generally Leslie E. Schaefer, Note, The Population Implosion of the Developed World: Changing Attitudes
Toward Immigration to Support Aging Societies, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357 (1998) (arguing that
immigrant labor will be needed to offset low to negative replenishment rates of aging developed societies).
5. Peter Francese, The Gray Continent, WALL ST. J., March 23, 1998, at A22.
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According to a recent article in the New York Times, "[a]bout 1.5 million
immigrants pour into the European Union every year. Aging populations, low
birth rates and European reluctance to do many menial jobs make this influx
inevitable. Europe and its immigrants need each other."6
During the first half of the twentieth century, scholars could not imagine
that elderly Europeans would someday have to rely on Muslim migrant labor.
Courbage and Fargues report that one late-nineteenth century French writer
lamented how Islam was "[a] dying race, that is being ended by contact with
us, is crying silently and with no strength."7 Yet, these Muslims of North
Africa, "whose imminent extinction had been predicted at the end of the
nineteenth century,"8 account for approximately one-half of the French
Muslim population,9 which numbers between four and five million
persons-almost equal to the number of French practicing Catholics." In
1948, the demographer Alfred Sauvy wrote at the thought of a Western
European Islamic community:
A region which is a little, but not much more remote, North
Africa and Algeria particularly, i.e., an area of high
demographic pressure, is already sending men to France; this
has obvious hygienic and social disadvantages. Will Europe
someday look further afield and draw upon the Middle East
or Asia?... Will Europeans be reduced to introducing large
numbers of young people from a more primitive civilization
in order to be safe in their old age? So far, this picture
requires an effort of imagination. This contingency is outside
the scope ofconj ecture, unless extremely unlikely events take
place."
6. Roger Cohen, Austria Throws Europe a Curve, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, § 4, at 1.
7. YOUSSEF COURBAGE & PHILIPPE FARGUES, CHRISTIANS & JEWS UNDER ISLAM 142 (Judy Mabo
trans., 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 141-42
9. Id. at 147.
10. John L. Allen, Jr., Europe's Muslims Worry Bishops, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 22, 1999, at 3.
11. Alfred Sauvy, Social and Economic Consequences of the Ageing of Western European
Populations, 2 POPULATION STUD. 115, 122 (1948).
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Today, Europeans have had to rethink such opinions. The unlikely events
imagined with dread by Sauvy have taken place. 2
The birth rates in Muslim countries have outstripped the world average for
years, 3 so as European reliance on imported labor increases, a significant
number of the imported laborers are Muslim. The spread of Islam by these
migrants has caused controversy and self-reflection as Europeans grapple with
what they perceive to be a distinctly un-Western phenomenon. 4 The
European reaction to Islam highlights the post-Cold War Western judgment
that Islam threatens Western political structures. 5 As Monshipouri notes,
Relations between the Muslim and Western worlds have
replaced the Soviet-Western standoff on the center stage in
the post-Cold War era. . . . [I]t has become fashionable to
speculate about the cultural conflicts between the Muslim
and Western worlds. Some Western observers have
concentrated attention on Islamic radicalism and militancy,
depicting Islam and Islamist movements as a 'global threat'
that must be curbed. Further, they have argued that the
Muslim world in general and Middle Eastern and North
African countries in particular are unable to embrace the
nature of modem human progress, namely, individual
freedoms, democratic governance, social tolerance, women's
rights, and political competition. 6
The perception that Islam poses a security threat to the West, however,
should be contrasted to the cooperation the Western military alliance received
from the Islamic nations during the 1991 Gulf War. Such cooperation
indicates that political and national security can trump religious alliances in
12. Germany recently acknowledged that economic realities will force it to ease restrictions on
imported labor. Yojana Sharma, Germany Accepts Thai it Needs Foreign Labor, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Feb. 25, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
13. See Islam and Population: Al Azhar Joins the Vatican, ECONOMIST, Aug. 27, 1994, at 34.
14. Id.
15. See Ulla Holm, Competing Regionalizations? French/European and Maghreb Views on
Regionalization, COLUM. INT'L AFF. ONLINE, at http://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/hou02/
hou02.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
16. Mahmood Monshipouri, The West's Modern Encounter with Islam: From Discourse to Reality,
40 J. CHURCH & ST. 25, 26-27 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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the Middle East. Furthermore, to view Christian-Muslim relations in a West-
East dichotomy ignores the fact that centers of Christian and Muslim power
are becoming decentralized as globalization causes the influence of both
religions to shift to Africa, Asia, and the Americas." The question is whether
Western fear of Islam and Muslim migrants is warranted. Or as Holm asks,
"Why does Europe, for instance, increasingly treat migration and Islam as
security problems with dramatic connotations and threat/defense implications,
rather than as ordinary political problems? And who speaks for Europe?"'"
To some extent, history speaks for Europe. The significant ties between
Islam and the West date to at least the eighth century A.D., when Charles
Martel urged his cavalry to advance against the invading Muslim army of the
C6rdoban governor during the Battle of Poitiers. 9 Other contacts between the
East and West have been less bellicose and more fruitful.20 For example, the
intellectual accomplishments of the Renaissance would not have been possible
but for Muslim intellectuals who incorporated and preserved the great
Western works of science, medicine, and philosophy and translated them into
Arabic from Greek and Latin.2' When Europeans emerged from the Dark
Ages, they turned to the great Muslim learning centers "to regain their lost
heritage."22 It is ironic, then, that after early Muslim scholars helped to
preserve vital elements of Western culture, contemporary Muslim scholars
have made few attempts to understand the Western ethos or to create a
cohesive political philosophy to challenge the West. Moreover, Muslim
scholarship has shown remarkable passivity toward globalization, as well as
to the Internet, the Human Genome Project, and other Western technological
and scientific revolutions.23 Nevertheless, although Muslim scholarship has
17. Id. at40.
18. Holm, supra note 15.
19. See Charles Martel, supra note 1.
20. See John L. Esposito, Islam & Christianity Face to Face, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 31, 1997, at I I
(noting that the early Muslim empires were far more tolerant toward Christians than the Christian empires
were toward Jews).
21. Id. See also Daniel Chirot, The Rise of the Wesi, 50 AM. Soc. R. 181, 189 (1985) (commenting
on the much-needed rationalizing influence of Islam on medieval Christianity). See generally Influence
ofIslamic Learning on the West, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, at http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/
article/0/0,5716,108330+12,00.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000); Alain de Libera, The Arab Forebears of
the European Renaissance, THE UNESCO COURIER, Feb. 7, 1997, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, at
http://www.britannica.com/bcom/magazine/article/0,5744,248089,00.htm; SAMUELC. CHEW, CRESCENT
AND THE ROSE: ISLAM AND ENGLAND DURING THE RENAISSANCE (1937).
22. See Esposito, supra note 20, at 11.
23. See Munawar A. Anees, Islam Faces a New Era, CIVILIZATION, Feb./Mar. 2000, at 58-59. See
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not kept abreast of all the advances of the West,24 Islam itself is not inherently
antithetical to those advances or to the Western democratic ideals that drive
them. For instance, T6treault notes that with all its deficiencies, the Kuwajti
model of democracy
is also a direct refutation of the arguments of those who insist
that Arab or Islamic countries are inherently incapable of
democracy. While the protection afforded many public
institutions in Kuwait is precarious, the private institutions of
positive liberty, grounded in culture and religion, have been
able to survive and even reverse authoritarian moves by the
state. Even the mosque, nominated as the scourge of
democracy by many observers, is not inherently
antidemocratic but, instead, is so valued as a protected space
that authoritarians and democrats struggle to regulate access
to it.25
Given that the Islamic political revolutions of the twentieth century did not
result in the political and theological changes for which many Muslims had
hoped,26  the time is ripe for another historic-and mutually
advantageous-meeting of Western and Eastern cultures. As Anees has said,
"Perhaps Muslim immigrants in the West will ultimately become the catalysts
for a major ideological transition for the global Muslim community.' ' "7 What,
then, is the future of European Muslims, "the Jews of the late twentieth
century?"2 In Part I of this Article, I discuss the Western perception of Islam.
also Richard Engel, Muslims Mull Technology's Effects, WASH.TIMES, July 8, 1998, at A 14 (reporting that
"Arab Muslims are extremely defensive toward globalization"). But see, Esposito, supra note 20, at I I
(stating that while Islamists reject the Westernization ofsociety, they accept modernization through science
and technology). See generally Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 53 (noting that globalization runs counter
to the Muslim ethic of protecting the powerless to the extent that globalization undercuts state welfare
functions and causes economic dislocation).
24. "Slowly but steadily, the human condition leans toward an unwavering commitment to human
dignity, liberty, and justice (constructs that are often but wrongly considered to be uniquely Western). While
this great drama is playing out in the cosmic theater, where are the Muslims?" Annes, supra note 23, at 57.
25. Mary Ann Ttreault, Patterns of Culture and Democratization in Kuwait, 30 STUD. COMP. INT'L
DEv. 26,40 (1995).
26. See Anees, supra note 23, at 59-'0.
27. Id. at 60.
28. See John Keane, Nations, Nationalism, and the European Citizen, COLUM. INT'L AFF. ONLINE,
at http://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/wps/kej0t/kej0l.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
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In Part II, I document the increase in the number of Muslims in the EU. In
Part III, I suggest that when the perceptibns surveyed in Part I and the
dwmographic trends documented in Part II meet, certain cultural, religious, and
legal conflicts will occur. I conclude by suggesting that Muslim migrants in
the EU do not threaten Western cultural, religious, or legal norms.
I. WHAT IS ISLAM?
Many Westerners believe that Islam conflates religion and politics29 into
a species of violent extremism. As Holm notes:
In Europe the Muslim is often depicted as the terrorist
incarnate, or as a bearded fanatic (le barbu) hiding a hand
grenade under his djellaba. In this image lurks the fear of the
uncontrollable uprising of the masses-similar to that of the
European bourgeoisie from 1830-1871 about an uprising of
the urban proletariat.30
There are extremists who operate under the rubric of Islam. Their numbers
are few, and their potential for violence is feared in the West.3 It is arguable,
however, that the degree of Western fear is disproportionate to the degree of
the threat.32 In truth, Westerners have more to fear from organized crime than
organized terrorists; there were only sixteen casualties in Western Europe
attributed to terrorist attacks in 1999. 3 None of the attacks were by Islamic
terrorist groups.34
Nevertheless, many Westerners insist on characterizing Muslims as
violent fanatics.35 For example, in the early 1990s, the U.S. Smithsonian
29. See Donath, supra note 2, at 138.
30. Holm, supra note 15. Cf. Islamic Iran Re-Examines Role of Violence, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 1999,
available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (noting that Iranian politicians are re-examining the use of
violence to achieve the goals of Islam).
31. See Esposito, supra note 20, at 11.
32. See, e.g., John Hooper, When in Rome, Do as the Muslims, GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 29, 1995,
available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (reporting the crackdown on a handful of Islamic fundamentalists
in Italy, and the xenophobic response to the building of a mosque in Rome).
33. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1999 129 (2000).
34. Id. at 16.
35. See generally Sebastian Poulter, Muslims: Separate System of Personal Law, in ETHNICiTY, LAW
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 197-201 (1998) (tracing Western anti-Muslim sentiment from the Middle Ages to the
256
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Museum of Natural History featured displays on Judaism and Islam as part of
a program on comparative religions. The display on Judaism featured
religious objects. The display on Islam featured weaponry. 6 In another
incident, Arabs were characterized as barbarians in the original first verse to
the song "Arabian Nights," which was written by Alan Menken and Howard
Ashman as the theme song for the Walt Disney children's cartoon movie
Alladin: "Oh I come from a land, from a faraway place/ Where the caravan
camels roam/ Where they cut off your ear/ If they don't like your face/ It's
barbaric, but hey, it's home."" These examples of bigotry are not unfortunate
because they are tolerated. They are unfortunate because they are not
recognized as bigotry. Or, as Esposito has said, "Muslims have experienced
levels of discrimination in society and the media in Europe and America that
would simply not be tolerated by Christians and Jews."38
Some Muslims are extremists,39 but the majority of Muslims are not. To
characterize Muslims in general as extremists overlooks the killing of
Christians by Christians in Ireland,4" or the violence committed by Christians
against abortion clinics in the United States. Just as the violence committed
by Christian terrorists does not represent Christianity, the violence committed
by Islamic terrorists does not represent Islam. Westerners, however, fail to
draw these distinctions.4 Whereas the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center in New York (which claimed six lives and injured more than 100
people) was linked to a small group of Muslim extremists,42 responsibility for
modem era).
36. See Michael P. Saba, Anti-Discrimination Committee Wins a Few for American Muslims,
MONEYCLIPS, May 18, 1993, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
37. ALAN MENKEN & HOWARD ASHMAN, Arabian Nights in ALLADIN (Walt Disney 1992) available
at The Rec.Arts.Disney Song Lyrics Archive at http://thoth.stetson.edu/users/BillSawyer/Disney/
TextFiles/Lyrics Aladdin.txt. (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
38. Esposito, supra note 20, at II.
39. "[l]t needs to be acknowledged that, in many instances, criticisms of Islamic regimes for human
rights violations are entirely justified; in particular, certain unacceptable forms of punishment and ill-
treatment of minorities tend to be defended by specific reference to religious norms." Poulter, supra note
35, at 201.
40. Since 1969, Protestant and Catholic terrorists in Ireland have killed more than 1,000 people--one-
quarter of them children. Study to Look at Child Victims, TIMES (LoNDON), Feb. 2, 2000, available at
LEXIS, News Group File, All.
41. "Part of the problem of interpretation is that when a Jewish extremist murdered Muslims at prayer
in the Hebron mosque or assassinated Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin ... we reflexively distinguished between
the mainstream faith of Jews... and the twisted use of religion by fanatics." Esposito, supra note 20, at
11.
42. See generally Jeff Barge, Sedition Prosecutions Rarely Successful: Government Tries to Beat
2000] 257
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the most spectacular mass killing on U.S. soil rests on the shoulders of U.S.
citizens who were willing to sacrifice their fellow citizens for inc6herent
political aims. That the U.S. public had turned a blind eye to its homegrown
fanatics was evident after more than 160 persons were killed in the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing. While the U.S. public and media indulged in
widespread speculation that "Muslim terrorists" had masterminded the
bombing,43 once one of the culprits, Christian and Anglo Saxon Timothy
McVeigh, was captured, all religious and ethnic stereotyping ceased. In the.
meantime, McVeigh has never been popularly described as a Christian
terrorist, as a Christian extremist, or as a Christian fanatic." Moreover,
McVeigh's ideological cousins, many of whom belong to anti-government
militias, are never described as Christian extremists, but as political
extremists. Yet, the U.S. public, always eager to see itself as the first and only
target of Islamic extremism, continues to fear the image of the bearded
Muslim bogeyman, especially when unexplained disasters occur.4 5 But not
every Muslim conflict is about the United States, or even about the West. As
Monshipouri has said, "[T]he recent Islamic awakening has little to do with
confronting the West and much to do with the constructive regeneration of
the Odds in Trial of Blind Cleric's Followers, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1994, at 16.
43. The British media have also persisted in a one-sided, monolithic viewof Islam such that criticism
of events in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Sudan are interpreted by some as veiled attacks on Muslims
living in Britain. See Poulter, supra note 35, at 200.
44. See Philip Shenon, Measure of Good Will Toward Muslims Backfires in House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 1999, at A20. Language in a recent House resolution, H.R. Con. Res. 174, 106th Cong. (1999),
inspired in part by the widespread bigotry directed toward Muslims and American Arabs subsequent to the
Oklahoma City bombing, would have denounced discrimination and intolerance against Muslims as
"wholly inconsistent with American values ofreligious tolerance and pluralism." However, House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Rep. Henry Hyde (R-I1l.) and Rep. Thomas M. Davis III (R-Va.) scrapped the
language that addressed discrimination against Muslims after Jewish and Christian groups lobbied the
politicians. See also Raeed N. Tayeh, Ignorance About Muslims Fuels Intolerance and Hatred, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 20, 1999, at A29.
45. In the absence of evidence that anything other than mechanical failure downed TWA Flight 800
off the coast of New York on July 17, 1996, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security,
chaired by U.S. Vice President Al Gore, responded to the disaster by concluding that commercial airlines
should use passenger profiling to screen potential terrorists. The model upon which it was recommended
that U.S. airlines rely was the passenger profiling system developed by El Al airlines of Israel. Although
the profiling criteria are kept secret, it is clear that among the criteria used by El Al to detain passengers
are whether a passenger is an Arab, a Muslim, or has an Arabic or Muslim name. See, e.g., Donna Smith,
Comment, Passenger Profiling: A Greater Terror than Terrorism Itself?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 167,
167-76(1998).
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Islamic societies. Fighting the 'Great Satan' is not the Muslim world's
preoccupation."
In part, the anxiety that Islam can provoke in Westerners derives from
Western ignorance of the origins and beliefs of Islam. Islam is one of the
three great monotheistic religions of the world. It began in seventh-century
Mecca, where Muhammad received a revelation from God that was later
recorded in a holy book, the Qur 'an.47 Muhammad's message was that God
would judge all humans at the end of time. Therefore, the faithful should
submit themselves to God's will and show their gratitude to God by "regular
prayer and other observances, and by benevolence and sexual restraint." '48
The basic tenants of Islam are found in the so-called "five pillars of faith:" the
shahada (profession of faith), prayer, the zakat (a tax analogous to Christian
tithing), fasting, and the hajj (the holy pilgrimage to Mecca).49 Modem Islam
can be categorized broadly into two sects: the Sunni, who represent orthodoxy
(and emphasize majority and communitarian principles, as well as tolerance
of diversity), and the Shi'ah, who trust in religious authority and seek
transcendental wisdom. On one analytical level, organic ties between religion
and politics do characterize Islam as it is practiced by the Sunni and the
Shi'ah,5° but the two spheres of influence should not be confused with each
other. The confluence of religion and politics in Islam is perhaps the aspect
of this religion that Westerners find most troubling, yet even within the
Muslim community there is no agreement about the proper role of religious
beliefs in shaping political governance. 5
46. Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 33-34.
47. See ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 14-15 (1991).
48. Id. at 16. The term "Islam" means "surrender." A "Muslim" is one who "surrenders to the will
of Allah" Islam, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA at http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/8/
0,5716,108138+1+105852,00.htmlquery=islam (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
49. Fundamental Practices and Institutions ofislam, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA at
http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/article/8/0,5716,1081 38+10+105852,00.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2000).
50. See Islamic Thought, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA at http://www.britannica.com/
bcom/eb/article/9/0,5716,108139+1+105852,00.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2000).
51. See Mehemet 0 t9, Islam and the West: Can Turkey Bridge the Gap? 26 FUTURES 815 (1994).
"The vitality of Islam far outweighs... the historic experiment of Leninism and socialism in the Third
World. It is an active world religion that sees humanity, society and politics as indivisible. Id. Cf. Ttreault,
supra note 25, at 35-36. T~treault's characterization of the mosque in the public life of Muslims conveys
more subtle ambiguities than does j0&t90's. On the one hand, "the mosque is, institutionally, the strongest
potential challenger of the state"; on the other hand, the mosque is also the state's "protector and a primary
support for ideologies enjoining submission to its authority." But see Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Trade
2000]
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II. EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHICS
Worldwide, more than 1.1 billion people are Muslim, or nearly one-
quarter of the global population.52 More than 310 million Muslims live in
Africa, more than 807 million live in Asia, more than 31.2 million live in
Eastern and Western Europe, and more than 1.6 million live in Latin
America." The three nations with the largest Muslim populations are
Indonesia (more than 197 million), Pakistan (more than 137 million), and
Bangladesh (more than 107 million). 4 In all, thirty-nine countries have
populations comprised of a Muslim majority.5 The predominately Muslim
countries of Africa and the Middle, Near, and Far East form a crescent around
Europe. Out of this crescent, millions of Muslim migrants have traveled to the
West.56 During the 1990s, the number of Muslims in the EU grew by
approximately 100 percent to about fourteen million, or roughly two percent
of the European population. 7 At least three million first-generation Muslim
migrants.are now permanent residents in the EU. 8 In the United Kingdom,
for example, Muslims number one million, 9 "of whom nearly one-third have
their origins in Pakistan,"" while in Germany, Muslims constitute the largest
Unions. Islam andImmigration, 9 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 65,70 (1988). "We respect muslim [sic]
law and French law, but French law comes first, because we're in France... Islam is a private matter." Id.
(citing to comments of an Algerian given during a government survey of Muslim immigrant attitudes
toward their own religious convictions). Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 41 (arguing that the assumption
of Islamic homogeneity between Muslim immigrants and their co-religionists does not exist in reality).
52. Adherents of All Religions by Six Continental Areas, Mid-1999, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 2001 692 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD ALMANAC).
53. Id.
54. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2000 41, 233, 378 (2000)
[hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK].
55. Oifit;Q, supra note 51, at 812. There are more than 5.8 million Muslims in the United States,
WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 52, at 689, which makes Muslims more than 2 percent of the U.S.
population. Approximately 25 percent of U.S. Muslims are from South Asia. Arabs constitute another 12
percent, and almost half are African-American converts. Some project that by 2010, Muslims in the United
States will outnumber Jews, making Muslims the second-largest faith next to Christianity. See Carla
Powers, The New Islam, NEWSWEEK, March 16, 1998, at 35.
56. OOt;0, supra note 51, at 822.
57. Allen, supra note 10, at 3 (citing to United Nations statistics).
58. O6otqo, supra note 51, at 819. While not all Turks are Muslim, the majority (95 percent) are,
which makes it reasonable to assume for the purpose of this Article that Turkish migrants are also Muslim
migrants.
59. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 54, at 518.
60. See Poulter, supra note 35, at 197.
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migrant group.6 ' Nearly half the 1.7 million migrants in the Netherlands hail
from Islamic countries, mainly Morocco, Suriname, and Turkey."' Overall, in
Germany, Belgium, France,6" and the Netherlands, Muslims account for one
to five percent of the population." Of approximately 8.1 million Austrians,65
2.04 percent, or a little more than 165,000 are Muslim." In Denmark, of
approximately 5.3 million people 67  102,000 are Muslims. 68  In Finland,
however, Muslims number (along with Catholics and Jews) less than one
percent of the total population.69 Muslims are officially estimated to number
more than 275,000 in Greece,7" whereas in Ireland they number approximately
7,000.7' In Italy, however, if migrants are counted, Islam is the second-largest
religion, withi approximately one million practitioners,72 7,000 of whom are
native Italians." There is a marginal Muslim presence in Luxembourg, but the
exact number is not known because the country does not keep track of such
statistics. 74 In Portugal, there are approximately 25,000 Muslims, primarily
61. OgfitqiL, supra note 51, at 819.
62. See Donath, supra note 2, at 139.
63. France, "one of the lead actors in the confrontation with Islam," Monshipouri, supra note 16, at
41, is a microcosm of the European Muslim macrocosm. In their ambition to rechristianize North Africa,
French colonists plunged deep into the Sahara in the nineteenth century, established the French language
among the North African population, and then gained a foothold in Tunisia in 1881 followed by Morocco
in 1912. See COURBAGE & FARGUES, supra note 7, at 132. On the eve of Algerian independence, two
million European Christians and indigenous Jews lived in the Maghreb; they believed their presence would
remain forever. The 100,000 Europeans who live in Algiers today are immigrants who, for the most part,
have no genealogical ties to the vanished colonists. Id. at 145. Muslims in France now probably outnumber
the country's historical minorities: Protestants and Jews. See Milton Viorst, The Muslims of France, 75
FOREIGN AFF. 5, 78 (1996). Some estimate that one out of every four persons in France will practice Islam
within the next twenty-five years. See Allen, supra note 10, at 3. An estimated 35,000 Muslims in France
are French converts to the religion. See Viorst, supra note 63, at 82.
64. OgiltqO, supra note 51, at 815; CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 54, at 171, 188.
65. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 54, at 32.
66. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report
on International Religious Freedom at. http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/irf/
irf rpt/irf austria.html (Sept. 5, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Annual Report].
67. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 54, at 137.
68. 2000 Annual Report, supra note 66, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
irf/irf rpt/irf denmark.html.
69. Id. at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/irf/irf rpt/irffinland.html.
70. CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 54, at 195.
71. See Imam Condemns Ireland's Reaction, IRISH TIMES (City Edition), Dec. 19, 1998, at 14.
72. 2000 Annual Report, supra note 66, at http://www.state.govlwwwlglobal/humanrights/
irf/irfrpt/irf italy.html.
73. See Was Vittorio Emanuel a Muslim?, MALAY. NAT'LNEWS AGENCY, April 12, 1999, available
at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
74. 2000 Annual Report, supra note 66, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/
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from Portuguese Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia. 5 In Spain, the
number is larger, estimated to be anywhere from 450,000 to 700,000 if illegal
immigrants are counted.76 In Sweden, Muslims number from 250,000 to
300,000,7" making Islam the second-largest religion in the country.78
Ill. LEGAL AND RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF THE MUSLIM PRESENCE IN
EUROPE
The spread of Islam through the EU will soon make Islam the largest
religion in certain countries; as noted supra, France and Italy will likely be the
first to undergo this demographic change. Such a fundamental alteration in
public religious belief raises threshold questions about the relationship
between and among EU Muslims, the law, and EU Christians.
A. Legal Implications of the Muslim Presence in Europe
Mluslim personal law79 (which includes laws regulating marriage, 0
divrce,8' and inheritance)," immigration law, public education, 3
employment, and human rights84 are bound to be the bases for legal battles
within Western legal systems as Islam extends throughout the EU. On the
other hand, the EU and neighboring Islamic countries share security concerns
about migration, conventional and non-conventional weapons, and the
irf/irfjrpt/irfluxembou.html.
75. Id. at http://www.state.govlwww/global/human-rights/irf/irfrptlirf portugal.html.
76. Id. at http'J/www.state.gov/www/global/human rights/irfirfrpt/irfspain.htmi.
77. Id. at http:l/www.state.gov/wwwlglobalhuman-rightslirf/irfrpt/irf sweden.html.
78. Muslim in Sweden to Have Their First Mosque, MALAY. GEN. NEWS, Oct. 13, 1998, available at
LEXIS, News Group File, All.
79. There are four schools of islamicjurisprudence, with significant doctrinal differences among them.
See Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are The Sharia And The Convention Compatible?
Appendix 1, 44 AM. U.L REv. 1949, 1970-71 (1995).
80. Central to the Islamic marriage contract is the payment of mahr (dower) to the wife to safeguard
her the financial position. Although Muslim marriages customarily are arranged, Muslim law recognizes
the competence of post-pubescent males and females to freely choose their own spouse. See id. at 200.
81. Venkatraman, supra note 79, at 1970-71.
82. Id. at 1967. See generally Poulter, supra note 35, at 201-10.
83. See Donath, supra note 2, at 138.
84. See Poulter, supra note 35, at 213-21.
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political and social insatiability in Islamic countries."5 Thus, while there are
numerous ways for the law to define the inevitable conflict between Islamic
and Western values, the shared concerns of the two cultural milieus could
form a cooperative basis for coping with these conflicts.
1. Muslim Personal Law
Many European Muslims have lobbied for the recognition of Islamic
marriage, divorce, and inheritance laws in their countries.86 The difficulty is
that many Islamic conventions conflict with the marriage laws of other
countries such as England, where the marriage ceremony is strictly regulated,
even down to the time of day it can be performed 7 though the law selectively
exempts certain religious groups.8 For example, some Muslim formalities
allow bride and groom proxies to exchange vows as long as witnesses are
present for a marriage to be legal.8 9 Furthermore, Islamic law allows a
husband to take up to four wives and allows persons less than sixteen years of
age to marry.9" Polygamy and prepubescent marriage, however, can cause
serious legal consequences in the West. For example, in one U.S. Midwestern
state, two Iraqi Muslim men were each charged with the crime of having sex
with a minor after two Iraqi Muslim girls less than sixteen years of age were
betrothed to them in an arranged marriage. The parents of the girls were
charged with child abuse and with contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
The girls were removed from their home and placed in a foster home. The
adults claimed that they did not know their actions-which are legal in
Iraq-were illegal in the United States.9 '
Arranged marriages are also valid pursuant to Muslim law; in some
instances, adult male relatives exercise tremendous discretion over the marital
choices of minors.92 Whereas divorce under Muslim law may be obtained in
85. See Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 40.
86. See Setting Themselves Apart, ECONOMIST, July 22, 1989, at 49.
87. English wedding must be solemnized between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m. before an authorized person. Id.
at 205. Poulter, supra note 35,
88. Jews and Quakers are exempt from English marriage law. Id.
89. See id. at 205-06.
90. Id. at 206.
91. See Margaret Talbot, Baghdad on the Plains, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. II, 1997, at 18-19.
92. Although Muslim marriages customarily are arranged, Muslim law recognizes the competence of
post-pubescent males and females to choose their own spouse. See Venkatraman, supra note 79, at 2001.
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a variety of ways, the laws of European nations are more restrictive. If a
Muslim husband and 'wife divorce, Muslim law favors granting custody of the
younger children to the mother and granting custody of the older children to
the father.93 Moreover, Muslim ex-husbands are only obliged to support their
ex-wives for the three months following the divorce, the period during which
ex-wives are forbidden to marry. Muslim laws of inheritance rest on elaborate
mathematical systems for allocating wealth among relatives and allow for a
comparatively small amount to be bequeithed to the wife. While the validity
of a Muslim will would probably withstand judicial scrutiny in the EU,
Muslim widows who have been left with inadequate support could
undoubtedly bring successful challenges to the will in Western courts ."'
In England, Muslim personal law was rejected by the government on three
grounds: Muslim personal law conflicted with the English tradition of unified
family law, there were so many variants of Muslim personal law that choosing
from among them was untenable, and there was no consensus whether English
civil courts or Muslim religious courts should administer the law.95 Muslim
law, however, could be reconciled with Western law by codifying the various
forms of Muslim law and eliminating the differences among them.9
6
Compared to Muslims in England (and as a result of a 1905 treaty between
Austria and the Ottoman Empire), Muslims in Austria have had limited
success in integrating their personal law and culture with Austrian society.
According to one source, "The [Austrian] Muslim community enjoys the
rights of free airtime on government-owned television channels, religious
education under the purview of the Muslim commuiity, and the provision of
a Islamic cemetery and permissible or halal slaughter house." 97 In Germany,
Muslims have a many religious freedoms, and the German government has
facilitated the study of Islam and the building of mosques.98
The examples of England, Germany, and Austria suggest that although
Muslim personal law sometimes conflicts with European law, cultural
93. See Poulter, supra note 35, at 206-08. The statutes of Arab and Islamic countries have changed
in recent years by raising the age at which children are placed in custody of the father. Id.
94. Id. at 209-10.
95. Id. at 211-12.
96. Id. at 228.
97. Abu Bakar Abdul Majeed, Perception the Key to Better Relations, NEW STRAITS TIMES
(MALAYSIA), Mar. 28, 1998, at 11, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
98. See M.Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Islamic Center to be Built in Berlin, Says German Aide, MONEYCLIPS,
Mar. 9, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
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accommodations and legal concessions can help to integrate Muslims into
European society without requiring Muslims to sacrifice all their cultural and
legal autonomy. Muslim personal law, however, may be limited in the West
by the conflict between Muslim law and human rights. Western lawmakers
will not grant cultural accommodations or legal concessions to polygamy,
forced marriage, the marriage of prepubescent girls, unilateral divorce by
husbands, and the ban against Muslim women marrying non-Muslims (even
though Muslim men are allowed to marry outside their faith).99
2. Education
Public education has frequently been a source of cultural and legal tension
between Muslims who want to preserve their identity and Europeans who
want all citizens to accept Western laws and values. In the late 1980s for
example, England refused to yield to Muslims' demands of for separate
schooling. Even though only five percent of British adults regularly practice
Christianity, England gave public support to Christian schools and denied it
to Muslim schools, which were viewed as a challenge to the British political
authority."°  Situations such as these have compelled many Muslims to
demand that Muslims be given the same right to separate schools that is given
to Christians and Jews."'' The reluctance of the British government to accept
Muslims' demands for separate education was a lost opportunity to build a
pedagogical bridge between the East and the West. A Western education that
does not exclude Muslim religious and cultural traditions would help the next
generation of Muslims to discover solutions to the conflicts between Islamic
law and Western law. 2 Although some Muslims would like Islamic schools
to teach the Western sciences, 3 without the willingness of Western
lawmakers to meet Muslims halfway on education policy, the opportunity to
compare Western and Eastern values will be lost.
In spite of the refusal of the West to accommodate Muslims' public
education demands, however, Islamic schools have been established in
Europe. In England and Germany, for example, Saudi Arabia recently built
99. See Poulter, supra note 35, at 213-21.
100. See Religious Schools, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24,1987, at 54.
101. See Poulter,supra note 35, at 211-12.
102. Id. at 230.
103. See Engel, supra note 23, at A14.
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King Fahd Academies, " which offer interested parties a chance to learn about
Islam and Islamic values. The Saudis also built-with the approval of the
Vatican-an Islamic Center in Rome for Muslims and non-Muslims.'o5 These
Islamic education resources could mediate the cultural struggles that
sometimes result from Muslims' attendance at Western public schools.
Such a struggle occurred in France in the late 1980s when the French
government prohibited the display of ideological, religious, or political
symbols in schools. Muslim girls defied the ban on religious grounds by
wearing the hijab, or head covering, in school."'° This fight lasted two years
until the Conseil d'Etat held that "freedom of expression should not be
jeopardized by the secular principles of education and that the girls should
therefore be able to wear their headscarves."' 7 Because public education can
promote tolerance and understanding, the integration of Eastern values with
Western pedagogies is a desirable way to avoid unproductive arguments about
cultural expressions, particularly cultural expressions that do not subvert
public education goals. For instance, although few Muslims live in Ireland,
the nation hosts Islamic cultural centers, and Irish educators practice tolerance
and work together with their Muslim students," 8 which suggests that the
integration of Eastern values and Western public education is possible.
3. Employment
Muslim migrants struggle with language and cultural barriers the same as
any migrant who seeks employment in Europe. The fact that a migrant is
Muslim has little to do with the discrimination he or she faces in the European
job market. Not speaking the language of the host country is enough to trigger
discrimination. As Wihtol de Wenden states, "The fact that industrial
economies now fail to deliver full employment has increased the probability
that members of linguistic minorities or of 'visible' races will suffer from
104. See Editorial, Emancipating Muslims, MONEYCLIPS, Sept. 17, 1995, available at LEXIS, News
Group File, All.
105. See lftikhar Ahmed, Opening of Rome Centre to Improve Image of Muslims, says MWL Chief,
MONEYCLIPS, June 20, 1995, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
106. See SARAH COLWNSON, BEYOND BORDERS: WESTERN EUROPE MIGRATION POLIcY TOWARDS THE
21ST CENTURY 24,25 (1993).
107. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
108. See Andy Pollack, "Good Place to Livefor Muslims," IRISH TIMES (City Edition), Nov. 15, 1996,
at 2, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
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discrimination, even when such discrimination is technically illegal."" °
Religious discrimination against Muslims typically will not occur until after
a Muslim surmounts the language barrier and is hired. 0 When a Muslim's
religious belief does conflict with workplace rules, laws that bar
discrimination on religious grounds provide incentives to find collaborative
market tradeoffs between matters of business and matters of faith. This was
the experience of the French Maghrebis, who reached new levels of political
legitimacy through union activity in the late 1980s."'
Blue-collar Muslims fall into three categories: those who reconcile their
faith with their employment,"' those who see no chance for reconciliation,
and those who distance themselves from their faith while they are in the
workplace.' " Maghrebi workers in the first two categories rejected the French
assimilation policy" 4 and demanded a right to their cultural and religious
identity. The government reacted as if "the mosque" exerted an influence over
Muslims with which no State could compete. Industry leaders, on the other
hand, viewed the mosque "as a calming factor and, even more, an instrument
of regulation in the operation of the plant.""'  Moreover, plant managers
discovered that regular time for prayer in designated areas reduced the risk of
industrial accidents, work interruptions, and ridicule from non-Muslims." 6
The workers in the third category, who distance themselves from their faith
in the workplace, practice what Wihtol de Wenden calls "quiet Islam: " 7
In most cases the conflict between the things which are
Caesar's and the things that are God's is resolved by taking
a certain distance from Islamic dogma, which the militants
109. See James Jupp, Creating Multicultural Societies: Australia, Britain, Sweden and Canada, 52
INT'L J. 508, 519 (1997).
110. Id. (noting that most multicultural policies do not promote migrant employment as much as they
discourage discrimination against migrants).
11. See Wihtol de Wenden, supra note 51, at 65-66.
112. The younger generation ofpracticing Muslims has a growing tendency to use religion for strategic
purposes, and frequently plays both ends-religion and trade unionism-against the middle of achieving
labor goals, without really privileging religion over unionism, or vice versa. Id. at 74.
113. Id.at72.
114. France has undergone a continual assimilation of its immigrants since the 1950s. See Franqois
Dubet, Marginality andMinorities in France's Immigrant Population, 3 CONTEMP. EUR. AFFAIRS 140, 141
(1990). See generally MYRON WEINER, THE GLOBAL MIGRATION CRISIS 47 (1995).
115. See Wihtol de Wenden, supra note 51, at 67-68.
116. Id. at 68.
117. Id.at74.
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seek to achieve by committing themselves to 'anti-sectarian'
campaigns (declarations of tolerance towards other religions)
or by the strength they draw for the Muslim community by
their militancy."'
The French example of organized Muslim laborers suggests that a younger
and more politically aggressive group of Muslim workers will evolve out of
the large number of Muslim migrants now entering Europe. "9 These younger
workers are more likely than the older workers to feel disenfranchised by the
breakdown of the working class, as opposed to sharing the older workers'
feelings of being disenfranchised by European culture. 20 As Dubet notes,
The symbol of immigration in France today is the young
person-the second generation immigrant. It is as if
yesterday's stereotype-the skilled worker-has been
replaced by today's Arab or black; this new character
represents less the oppressed worker, than the victim of
difficulties at home and in the neighbourhood, prone to social
deviance and faced with obstacles to political participation. 2'
The French example also shows that employment law can prevent
religious discrimination by employers against employees, but that employment
law cannot regulate employer and employees' daily tradeoffs between
business and faith. Moreover, nothing in the French example suggests that the
law should regulate such a tradeoff. There is no stereotypical "Muslim
employee" who adheres to a monolithic Islamic agenda. Rather, the French
example suggests that a worker's faith may or may not be used as a bargaining
chip in labor-management negotiations.
118. Id.at7l.
119. !d.at76-81.
120. See Dubet, supra note 114, at 142-43.
121. Id. at 142.
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4. Immigration
Europeans continue to distrust Muslim migrants. A 1993 British opinion
poll revealed that nearly one-third of the English surveyed would prefer not
to have Arabs or Pakistanis as neighbors, more than one-quarter believed that
Pakistanis provoked hostility toward themselves, and more than one-fifth said
the same about Arabs.'22  During the past few years in England,
"islamaphobia," or "a dread or hatred of Islam and Muslims"'23 has steadily
risen. A 1997 survey of EU Member States, however, showed that U.K.
citizens had no strong feelings about southern Mediterranean migrants in the
EU. '24 U.K. citizens are less accepting of Eastern European workers than are
two-thirds of the EU Member States, 2 ' but display average tolerance of the
overall number of foreigners living in the EU 26 and above average tolerance
of different nationalities and races. 
127
In contrast to the mixed tolerance of U.K. citizens for foreigners, Austrian
voters acting on their fear of Turkish migrants propelled Jorg Haider's right
wing Freedom Party into a coalition with the Austrian government. 2 Austria
appears to be in no immediate danger of a migrant invasion-with a migration
rate of 1.32 migrants per 1,000 members of the population, Austria ranks
seventh out of the fifteen EU Member States as a destination for migrants. '29
Nevertheless, Austrians have little tolerance of southern Mediterranean and
Eastern European workers. 3 Fifty percent of Austrians believe there are too
many foreigners living in the EU,' 3 though less than one-fifth of Austrians
actually find the presence of different nationalities and races in Austria
"disturbing."'3 Still, Haider's praise of certain Third Reich economic
policies' caused concern at the highest level in the EU.
122. See Poulter, supra note 35, at 200.
123. Id.
124. See 48 STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 68 fig.6.1a (1998), available at http://europa.eu.intl
comm/dgl0/epo/eb.html (last visited Nov., 26,2000).
125. Id. at 69 fig.6.1b.
126. Id. at 71 fig.6.2.
127. Id. at 72 figs. 6.3 & 6.4.
128. See Cohen, supra note 6, at I.
129. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2000
130. See EUROBAROMETER, supra note 124, at 68 fig.6.1 a, 69 fig.6.1b.
131. Id. at71 fig.6.2.
132. Id. at 72 figs. 6.3 & 6.4.
133. See Nazi Echoes in Austria, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1999, at B2.
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In Antwerp, the recently elected right wing government contemplated
deporting all 40,000 Arab and North African workers to create new jobs,
while the Belgium government fretted about threats from Islamic
fundamentalists outside the country. '"' Belgians have the distinction of being
the most intolerant people in the EU. Thirty-eight percent of Belgians do not
believe that southern Mediterranean workers should be allowed in the EU. 35
Thirty-seven percent do not believe that Eastern European workers should be
allowed in the EU. 36 Sixty percent believe there are too many foreigners
living in the EU. ' Twenty-two percent are disturbed by the presence of other
nationals in Belgium,3 3 and thirty percent are disturbed by other races in
Belgium.139
Degrees of xenophobia have also been observed in other EU Member
States. In Italy, where thousands of Muslim refugees from Bosnia have
entered the country, the reaction to foreigners has been mixed. Some Italians
want to exclude Muslims from the country, whereas others, determined that
fascism will not gain another foothold in Italy, condemn racism and
discrimination against Muslims. 4 ' In France during the early 1990s, LePen's
National Front made the issue of naturalization central to political debate 4'
and weakened the principle of jus soli. "2 There were also outbreaks of
xenophobia in the Scandinavian countries around this time.'43
134. See Threat from Islamist Groups in Belgium, THE HINDU, June 29, 1999, available at LEXIS
News Group File, All.
135. See EUROBAROMETER, supra note 124, at 68 fig.6.Ia.
136. Id. at 69 fig.6.Ib.
137. Id. at 71 fig.6.2.
138. Id. at 72 fig. 6.3.
139. Id. at fig.6.4.
140. See Recap of CBS This Morning's News (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 24, 1992), available at
LEXIS News Group File, Transcripts.
141. See Tomas Hammar, Laws and Policies Regulating Population Movements: A European
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION SYSTEMS 258 (Mary M. Kritz et al. eds., 1992).
142. Latin for "right of the soil." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed., 1999). "The rule that a
child's citizenship is determined by place of birth." Id. See also Jost Delbrack, Global Migration-
Immigration-Multiethnicity: Challenges to the Concept ofthe Nation-State, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD,
45, 56 (1994). Of 176 countries recently surveyed, more than three-fourths naturalize aliens based onjus
sanguinis. (This term is Latin for"right of blood." and is "[tlhe rule that a child's citizenship is determined
by the parent's citizenship." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 868 (7th ed., 1999)). Charles Wood, Losing
Control ofAmerica's Future-The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and IllegalAliens, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 465, 496 n.87 (1999) (citing to an unpublished 1994 U.S. Office of Personnel Management report).
143. See Hammar, supra note 141, at 258.
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Although EU policy is to harmonize the migration laws of Member
States, '" the European Court of Justice held in Florus Aridl Wisenbeek that
each Member State remains free to impose limited restrictions at its border
until the EU completely unifies all migration laws:
• [A]s long as Community provisions on controls at the
external borders of the Community . . . have not been
adopted, the exercise of those rights presupposes that the
person concerned is able to establish that he or she has the
nationality of a Member State.. . .- Member States remain
competent to impose penalties for breach of such an
obligation .... However, Member States may not lay down
a penalty so disproportionate as to create an obstacle to the
free movement of persons, such as a term of imprisonment.'45
Consistent with the ECJ ruling, French officials have limited the number of
visas issued to Algerians while intensifying the domestic hunt for terrorists.'"
According to Holm, the French dragnet for foreigners has "kindled the fire of
xenophobia and thus confirmed the prejudice that people with the Maghreb
view are carriers of the 'islamist disease,' threatening to infect the French
blood, as well as spreading terror."' 47
144. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches
to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 1001-6 (1995); Report from the Ministers
Responsible for Immigration to the European Council Meeting in Maastricht on Immigration and Asylum
Policy, in THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 449-91
(Elspeth Guild ed., 1996).
The pressure of immigration on most Member States has increased significantly in
recent years. The conviction that, confronted with these developments, a strictly
national policy could not provide an adequate response has been consistently gaining
ground... the aim is to make the problem manageable for the entire Community.
This will require instruments which are based on an extended form of co-operation
among Member States.
Id. at 458.
145. See EUROPA, Recent Case-Law of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, Case
378/97, Florus Ariel Wijsenbeekat http://curia.eu.int/en/act/act99/9923en.htn#ToC7 (last visited Nov. 26,
2000).
146. See Holm. supra note 15.
147. Id.
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Spanish lawmakers, on the other hand, did not start requiring that
Moroccans enter Spain with a visa until legal and illegal Muslim migrants
flooded the country in the early 1990s. Before then, Muslim migrants from
North Africa simply passed through Spain on their way to France or Italy.
The Spanish parliament also legalized tens of thousands of illegal Muslim
migrants when it began working with the Moroccan government to repatriate
North Africans who were using Morocco as a conduit to Spain. 4 ' In fact, of
all Europeans, the Spanish are the most tolerant of southern Mediterranean
and Eastern European workers. 4 9 Spanish tolerance notwithstanding, more
than one scholar believes that "migration policy can no longer be decided
simply on the basis of state sovereignty or the idea that a government need
only control its borders."'"5
The national borders between Turkey and Western Europe'' and the
effects of national borders on non-EU Muslims will shape the evolution of
European migration policy.112 Western European states that border Muslim
countries or serve as gateways into Europe for North African and Middle
Eastern Muslims will be pressured by the interior Western European nations
to control migration by controlling naturalization. These controls will rest
upon notions of consanguinity, race, and ethnicity because the migration
policies of most EU Member States are underwritten by the cultural
homogeneity and ethnic dominance of non-Muslim Europeans.'53 Hence, not
only will Muslims face barriers to European migration, but they will face
resistance to their naturalization upon arrival. Such resistance will appear
148. See Simon Courtauld, Moors May Prove Too Much for Spain, SUN. TELEGRAPH, Mar. 15, 1992,
at 106, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All.
149. See EUROBAROMETER,supra note 124, at 68 fig.6.1a, 69 fig.6.lb
150. WEINER, supra note 114, at 170.
151. At least sixty-four percent of EU citizens have little to no trust of Turks, which makes the Turks
the least trusted of all EU trading partners. See 46 STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 44 fig.4.4 (1996),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comndgl0/epo/eb.html. Such distrust partly results from the political
unrest within and around Eastern Europe. For example, the Greek courts during the mid-1990s ruled that
using the word "Turkish" to describe Greek Muslims who lived near the border of Turkey endangered
public order owing to tensions between Greece and Turkey. See Bill Schiller, An Ages-old Wound Reopens
in the Greek Land that Borders Turkey, TORONTO STAR, Feb. II, 1994, at A 19.
152. See Harnmar, supra note 141, at 246.
153. See WEINER, supra note 114, at 29-30; Hanmar, supra note 141, at 256.
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lawful, but beneath the laws runs a strong current of European xenophobia'54
and resistance to assimilating foreigners.,5
B. Religious Implications of the Muslim Presence in Europe'56
When compared with many Christians, Muslims do not hold beliefs
radically at odds with Western values. According to Monshipouri, "[r]ecent
Protestant and Catholic revivalist tendencies parallel those of Islam in their
reactions against rapid change and in their general moralistic and politico-
religious overtones as well as in their specific approach toward the status of
women.""' Moreover, Muslims and Catholics hold similar official views on
family planning and homosexuality. In 1994, as the International Conference
on Population and Development was approaching, Muslim leaders denounced
U.N. support for contraceptives, abortion, and non-traditional families as a
threat to family values and a sanction of the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases.' The two religions share other common qualities: both preach a
universal message and mission, and both are "supercessionist theologies"'5 9
(i.e., both communities claim to fulfill the divine destiny of an, earlier group
that went astray). 6° Although Christians are not bothered by their own
supercessionist attitudes towards Jews, Christians are troubled by Muslim
supercessionist attitudes towards Christians.' 6' Italian Archbishop Giuseppe
Bernardini has said, "The 'dominion' has already begun with the 'petro-
dollars,' used not to create work in the poor North African or Middle Eastern
154. See WEINER, supra note 114, at 140. There is no consensus on the scope of xenophobia in
Europe. Banton, for example, downplays the severity of European xenophobia, noting that "[t]he influence
of the far right depends both upon the failure or refusal of mainstream parties to cater to any sense of
grievance, and upon the activity of small numbers of extremists whose organizations tend to be short-lived
since their leaders quarrel with one another." See Banton, supra note 3, at 18.
155. Id. at 47. See also James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission ofAliens Under International
Law, 77 AM. J INT'L L. 804, 833 (1983); Heinz Fassman & Rainer Munz, Patterns and Trends of
International Migration in Western Europe, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 457, 473 (1992); CLAUDE-
VALENTIN MARIE, THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU AND IMMIGRATION IN 1994: LESS TOLERANCE AND
TIGHTER CONTROL POLICIES 7 (1997).
156. For a scholarly treatment of Islamic-Christian relations, see THE CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM FRONTIER:
CHAOS, CLASH OR DIALOGUE? (Jergen S. Nielsen ed. 1998).
157. See Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 42.
158. See Islam and Population. supra note 13, at 34.
159. Esposito, supra note 20, at 11.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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countries, but to build mosques and cultural centers in Christian countries with
Islamic immigration, including Rome, the center of Christianity."'62 Other
Church leaders say that the statistics on European Muslims are exaggerated.
These Church leaders note that Christian evangelical religions have just as
much appeal in Europe as Islam.'63 Furthermore, all three Abrahamic faiths
experience diverse responses to modem political, economic, and social
problems within the various communities.'64 The official Church position
toward Islam appears to be tolerant and even conciliatory; Pope John Paul 1
has met with Muslim leaders more than fifty times, which exceeds the number
of combined visits of all previous popes in history. 5"
Islam in Europe will no doubt trigger a mixed response from European
Christians.'66 If policymakers act with foresight, they could enlist the help of
the Church to ameliorate public alarm. Nevertheless, Islam and Christianity
are bound to clash. This was the case when the freedom of literary expression
collided with the freedom from religious discrimination in the "Rushdie
Affair," the outcome of which was viewed by many as a measure of Muslims'
acceptance of Western values.'67
Salman Rushdie's 1988 novel, The Satanic Verses, was thought by
Muslims worldwide to be an attack on Islam. Muslims in England
unsuccessfully argued in court that the English blasphemy laws, which would
have forbidden Rushdie from disparaging Christianity, should have been
extended to Islam. 6 * The case was later argued before the European
Commission of Human Rights on the theory that Rushdie's novel violated
162. See Allen, supra note 10, at 3.
163. Id.
164. See Esposito, supra note 20, at 11.
165. See Allen, supra note 10, at 3.
166. See, e.g., Italian Bishop Warns of Marrying Muslims, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at A2
(quoting Bishop Clemente Rivera of Rome as saying that Roman Catholic women should be discouraged
from marrying Muslims "because they [presumably Rivera meant Roman Catholic women] do not know
what awaits them.").
167. See Sebastian Poulter, Human Rights and Minority Rights, in ETHNICITY, LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 197 (1998). See generally Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Hunan Rights:
The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, I I EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29 (1997)
(arguing that Islamic societies will achieve greater unity, stability, and prosperity while retaining their
cultural identity if they promote freedom of expression).
168. Regina v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Choudhury, I App. Cas. 429 (Q.B.
1991).
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Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.'69 The
Commission dismissed the complaint, and held that Article 9 of the
Convention does not guarantee a right "to bring any specific form of
proceeding against those who, by authorship or publication, offend the
sensitivities of an individual or of a group of individuals."' 7 ° On the other
hand, the Commission had ruled that a movie that exhibited a "provocative
anti-Christian attitude"'' because it depicted "God the Father as a senile and
impotent fool, Christ as a cretin, and his [sic] mother, Mary, as a lascivious
lady, and ridiculed the Eucharistic ceremony" 7' could legitimately be seized
by Austrian authorities.'
One lesson of the Rushdie Affair, then, is that a dispute over human rights
can be settled in court rather than by declaring afatwa.'74 Nevertheless, to
justify State confiscation of an anti-Christian movie on the one hand, while
protecting works of art that attack Islam on the other, must leave Muslims
doubting whether Islam can receive fair and equitable treatment in European
courts. The outcome of the Rushdie Affair, however, did not reach the
substantive issues, because a private rather than a State actor was involved.
Thus, neither the holding in Choudhury nor the decision in Otto-Preminger-
Institut necessarily bode ill for Muslims who seek protection for their beliefs
under human rights laws. Otto-Preminger-Institut and Choudhury together
stand for the broad proposition that the State may lawfully intervene on behalf
of religious beliefs even when the courts will not find a private cause of
action.
V. ASSIMILATION AND INTEGRATION
The topic of Muslims' rights is a subset of the topic of "group rights."' 75
Although culture and ethnicity are components of a person's identity, "there
169. See European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,230, 232 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). Articles 9 and 14 uphold the right
of religious freedom and freedom from religious discrimination.
170. See Choudhury v. United Kingdom, in 12 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 172,172 (1991).
171. See Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria 69, EUR. COMM'N H.R. DEC. & REP. 173, 176 (1991).
172. Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. See Otto-Preminger-Institut v. AusTia, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS L.J. 34, 56 (1995).
174. See Poulter, supra note 167, at 104.
175. See Poulter, supra note 167, at 92-93; Holm, supra note 15 (arguing that what Muslims want in
Europe is an "islamized social space" that will shield Muslim immigrants from Western influence).
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are dangers in allowing the group to dictate what cultural rights an individual
should be free to exercise."'7 6  The goal of any group right should be to
encourage and help members enjoy their individual rights without requiring
them to sever their ethnic and cultural community ties.' Many multicultural
policies are cautiously designed to promote ethnic pride and awareness,' but
some lawmakers do not wish to promote multicultural awareness at all. For
example, in an open letter to Muslims, one British politician told them that
they could not be British citizens on their own exclusive terms or on a
selective basis and still demand from the government "a real degree of
integration, or active participation in the mainstream." '
The success of States such as Sweden in promoting multiculturalism has
resulted from effective political leadership, but success has limits. A
homogeneous society like that of Sweden has found it difficult to define the
role of migrants. 8 ° Moreover, the concept of a multicultural identity is
irreconcilable with the concept of assimilation and nationalism. 8' Many
people fear that multicultural policies will create ethnic federalism, which
carries a high risk of violence and instability.'82 It is reasonable, therefore, to
expect Muslim migrants who fear losing their cultural identity and wish to
retain it to be sensitive to the fact that nearly fifty percent of EU citizens fear
176. See Poulter, supra note 167, at 94.
177. Id.
178. See Jupp, supra note 109, at 517 (noting the experience of Sweden).
179. See Setting Themselves Apart, supra note 86, at 49 (internal quotations omitted).
180. See Jupp, supra note 109, at 518-19.
181. Id. at 520. See also Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 39-40 (noting the struggle between
assimilation and retention of cultural identity). The particularization of cultural identity has also clashed
with the homogenization of consumer culture as global marketing schemes co-opt cultural icons to trigger
identification with mass-produced goods. The results have frequently backfired. McDonald's and Coca-
Cola printed on hamburger sacks and beverage containers the flags of the 24 countries competing in the
1994 World Cup soccer tournament in Los Angeles. The flag of Saudi Arabia bears the shahada, or the
Islamic credo, "There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is His Prophet." Muslims in England and Spain
were outraged, not only that scripture from the Qur'an was being used to sell junk food, but that once the
food was consumed, the containers bearing the scripture were thrown into the garbage. See Jeremy Bagott,
Saudi Flag Faux Pas Tops Marketing Blunders List, DALY NEWS OF L.A., Oct. 17,1999, at B 1, available
at LEXIS, News Group File, All. The Dutch brewery Heineken also offended Muslims during the same
period by reproducing the Saudi flag on beer bottles. Muslims eschew alcohol as a matter of faith. See
Latest Marketing Fouls in World Cup Soccer Promotions, EUROMARKETING, July 5, 1994, available at
LEXIS, News Group File, All. The web site www.totalsports.net pulled ads that depicted Muslims praying
to a basketball after the Council on American-Islamic Relations complained. The ads were part of the
company's "Total Devotion" campaign. See Kostya Kennedy et al., Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
March 6, 2000, at 25.
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losing their own cultural identity and wish to retain it.'83 Although the
policies of cultural identity could be divisive between non-Muslim Europeans
and Muslim migrants, acknowledging their shared fear of cultural identity loss
could provide the basis for mutual understanding. Also, time will no doubt
temper divisions as later generations of Muslims identify with the politics,
law, and culture of their host countries. Once first generation Muslims
migrate to a Western European state, the likelihood increases that they will
integrate with the culture of their host country, or that their children will." 4
Moreover, just as Christians have become more secular in democratic nations,
so too will Muslims become more secular in their democratic host countries. 5
Nevertheless, Muslims loyalty will likely be questioned for several years.
Saudi Arabian and Moroccan leaders, for example, urge Muslim migrants to
send foreign currency to their home states to enhance the foreign currency
reserves there, and Muslim religious leaders occasionally visit host countries
to supervise the observance of Muslim religious holidays. But do these events
evince Muslim migrant "disloyalty" to Europe? Many European Muslims
practice a brand of Islam "that is not inspired by politics from the country of
origin. ' Furthermore, why question the loyalty of European Muslims when
Westerners do not question whether the loyalty of Catholics will lead to
Vatican subversion of Western policies? Catholic loyalty is not questioned
because the Catholic Church generally agrees with Western policies,1 87 but
even when the Church disagrees, the loyalty of Western Catholics is not
questioned. Likewise, European Muslims do not march in lockstep with a
central Islamic authority. In fact, the existence of a central Islamic authority
is called into question daily with the globalization of the Islamic faith among
adherents as diverse in their religious practices as they are in their political
practices. Given time, patience, and a willingness to compromise on both
sides, there is no reason why European Muslims cannot earn or should be
denied the same trust given to European Christians.
183. See 51 STANDARD EUROBAROMETER 44 fig.3.7 (1999), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgIO/epo/eb.html.
184. Cf Setting Themselves Apart, supra note 86, at 49 ("The Muslim's campaign for the right to be
separate is in itself evidence of integration.... Ten years ago the older generation of Muslims would
probably not have had the confidence, nor their leaders the command of English, to mount such a
campaign.").
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187. See Allen, supra note 10, at 3.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The public image of European Muslims depends whether Europeans view
Islam as a cultural phenomenon or a political phenomenon. If Europeans view
Islam as a threat to Western values, cooperation with and assimilation of
Muslim migrants will be difficult, but not impossible. If Europeans view
Islam as a political movement that opposes authoritarian regimes, then the
likelihood increases that Muslims will assimilate into Western society without
losing their cultural values.' To regard Islam as a political force consistent
with Western liberal values may sound far fetched to some. Prominent
Muslim intellectuals, however, purport to reconcile the best of Islamic
humanitarianism with the best of Western liberalism. These commentators
argue that Western liberal values are belied by the deleterious effects of
Western realpolitik, imperialism, and capitalism;8 9 implicit in their arguments
is the assumption that Western liberalism is a worthy standard against which
to judge the acts of Western states. In particular, Iranian President Seyyed
Muhammed Khatami articulates Muslim approval and disapproval of the
West:
To understand the West, the best tool is rationality, not
heated, flag-waving emotionalism.... We have to keep in
mind that Western civilization rests on the idea of 'liberty' or
'freedom.' ... The West indeed has freed humans from the
shackles of many oppressive traditions. It has successfully
cast aside the deification of regressive thinking that had been
imposed on the masses in the name of religion. It has also
broken down subjugation to autocratic rule. .. . Yet, at the
same time, the view of the West about humans and freedom
has been rigid and one-dimensional, and this continues to
take a heavy toll on humanity.... Indeed, we take issue with
the West on the notion of freedom. We do not think that the
Western definition of freedom is complete. Nor can the
188. Cf Holm, supra note 15.
189. It must be remembered that the experiences of Muslims with the West include the historical
replacement of Muslim self-rule by European colonialism. See Esposito, supra note 20, at 11.
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has been rigid and one-dimensional, and this continues to
take a heavy toll on humanity.... Indeed, we take issue with
the West on the notion of freedom. We do not think that the
Western definition of freedom is complete. Nor can the
Western definition of freedom guarantee human happiness.
The West is so self-absorbed in its historical setting and
thoughts that it cannot see the calamities that its incorrect
view of humanity and freedom has caused."
As Jupp notes, the goals of Western liberal democracies are "the
consolidation of social harmony, the reduction of disadvantage and prejudice,
the maintenance of cultural variety, the equalization of service delivery, and
the satisfaction of a segment of the electorate."' 9 ' These goals provide a moral
and legal basis upon which Islam and the West can start to collaborate.
Although Islam is a critique of Western values (some would call Islam a
corrective to Western values), Islamic beliefs are cognizable from the Western
liberal perspective. Moreover, as Monshipouri asserts, the reasons for
Westerners and Muslims to collaborate outweigh the reasons for both groups
to distrust one another: "In the end, it is the exigency of coexistence and
facing similar problems, such as virulent nationalism, ethnic strife, the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, massive migrations, refugees, the gender
issue, the ecological and environmental problems, and the dangers of the
spread of deadly diseases like AIDS, that makes it imperative for Western and
Muslim worlds to work together."' 92
The goals of Western liberalism and the goals of Islam are not mutually
exclusive, but as President Khatami has suggested, there can be differing
legitimate interpretations of the success of Western liberalism. These
differences, however, should open a dialogue between the West and the East,
not foreclose it. The topic of Muslim migrants in Europe is a starting point for
this dialogue and an opportunity to clarify Eastern and Western assumptions
about Islam and Western liberalism. The globalization of Islam has touched
Western Europe, and Islam and the West will be reshaped by this historic
190. MOHAMMED KHATAMI, Our Revolution and the Future of Iran, in ISLAM, UBERTY, AND
DEVELOPMENT 64-66 (Hossein Kamaly trans., 1998).
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192. See Monshipouri, supra note 16, at 56.
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topics of shared interest and concern will facilitate the peaceful integration of
these two great communities.
